

Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti as Philosophical Opponents with attention to *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*, verse 34

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국문 초록

이 논문은 새로 출판된 티벳 사본의 근거를 바탕으로 아띠샤 디뵘까라쉬리즈나(Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, 982-1054년)와 라뜨나까라산띠(Ratnākaraśānti 약 970-1030년) 사이의 철학적인 차이를 조사하는 것이다. 티벳의 역사가들은 아띠샤를 비끄라마설라 사원에서 라뜨나까라산띠의 밑에서 대승문헌을 공부했던, 라뜨나까라산띠의 제자로 기술하고 있다. 이 자료들에서 라뜨나까라산띠 또한 아띠샤로 이어지는 많은 리니지(lineage) 중 한 명의 탄트라 스승으로 기록되고 있다. 그렇지만 이 논문에서 밝혀듯이, 이 중요한 두 명의 인도 불교학자들은 철학적 견해에서 중요한 차이를 보이고 있다.

이 논문은 라뜨나까라산띠와 아띠샤의 저작에서 발견되는 사상들을 비교하는데, 이를 통해 이 둘의 생각과 주석의 많은 부분이 어떻게 다른지를 명확하게 밝히고자 한다. 비록 라뜨나까라산띠와 아띠샤 모두는 용수의 중도(中道 *madhyama pratīpa*)를 따른다고 주장한다. 그렇지만, 아띠샤의 사상은 찬드라끼르띠(Candrakīrti)의 영향을 받은 반면 라뜨나까라산띠는 그의 사상체계를 유가행파 자료들에 근거하여 상술하고 있다.

이 논문에서는 두 학자들의 차이를 명확하게 하는 특정한 예시로서, 용수의 『육십송여리론』(*Yuktiśaṣṭikā*) 34번째 계송에 주목하였다. 아띠샤는 이 계송을 의존하여 일어나는 ‘단순한 현현’(snang ba tsaṃ)의 견지에서 해석한 반면, 라뜨나까라산띠는 ‘불이의 순수한 빛’(advaya prakāśamātra)이라는 궁극적인 본성을 지닌 정신적 속성들 위에 그의 해석을 세웠다. 이 논문은 라뜨나까라산띠와 아띠샤의 이러한 사상적 차

이가 11세기 인도의 비끄라마술라 사원에 있었던 그 둘의 관계에 막대한 영향을 미쳤다고 결론지었다.

주제어 : 아띠샤, 라뜨나까라산띠, 중관학과, 유가행과, 『육십송여리론』

I. Introduction

This article examines philosophical differences¹⁾ between Atiśa Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna (982-1054 CE) and Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970-1030 CE) based on evidence, in part, from newly published Tibetan manuscripts of the *Collected Works of the Kadampas* (*bka' gdams gsung 'bum*). Atiśa is famous for his journey to Tibet and his teaching there for thirteen years. His teachings on Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhist thought and practice came to influence all subsequent traditions of Buddhism in Tibet. Ratnākaraśānti, also known as Śāntipa in Tibetan sources, was a formidable figure at Vikramaśīla monastery, renowned for his enormous breadth of learning and prolific scholarship. Traditional Tibetan historians describe Atiśa as Ratnākaraśānti's student in the study of Mahāyāna works at Vikramaśīla. Ratnākaraśānti is also recorded in these sources as being a tantric master in a number of lineages upheld by Atiśa. As Mochizuki (2018) has recently noted, at least seven esoteric Buddhist lineages are recorded in Tibetan sources to have been conferred from Ratnākaraśānti to Atiśa. Yet, as I demonstrate, these two important Indian Buddhist scholars had significant differences in their philosophical views.²⁾

I initially outline the works and teaching of Ratnākaraśānti and then compare Ratnākaraśānti's teaching of the Middle Way to that of Atiśa. Although both Atiśa and

1) As indicated below, the philosophical differences in the textual sources concern a difference in view or vision (Skt. *darśana*, Tib. *lta ba*) to perceive reality rather than doctrinal tenets or *siddhānta* (*grub mtha'*). Ruegg (1981, 1n3, 2n6, 3; 2000, 133–136) notes the difference between *dṛṣṭi* and *darśana* in the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

2) Note that recent studies on Ratnākaraśānti (McNamara 2017, Luo 2018) do not identify Atiśa as either Ratnākaraśānti's student or potential philosophical opponent.

Ratnākaraśānti claimed to follow the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratīpat*) of Nāgārjuna, Atiśa's thought was influenced by Candrakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti expounded his system based on Yogācāra sources. As a specific example to illustrate the differences between these two scholars, I focus on their interpretation of Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34), where Atiśa interprets the verse in terms of dependently arisen mere appearances (*snang ba tsam* ≈ **pratibhāsamātra*) that are conjunctions of form and emptiness while Ratnākaraśānti framed the ultimate nature of mental qualities as their "mere luminosity of non-duality" (*advayaprakāśamātra*).

II. Ratnākaraśānti

Ratnākaraśānti is said to have held the position of eastern gatekeeper at Vikramaśīla and to have been a teacher of the Tibetan translator Drokmi Śākya Yeshé (993-1077 CE) in addition to being Atiśa's teacher.³⁾ He composed numerous works in a variety of subject areas such as valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), the *Perfection of Wisdom* (*prajñāpāramitā*), Yogācāra, Tantra, as well as Buddhist verse metrics (*candahśāstra*) and riddles (Isaacson 2013). Ratnākaraśānti wrote at least thirty works, many of which are only preserved in Tibetan, but a fair number of his compositions also survive in Sanskrit. His works on valid cognition include the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*, a digest where he formulated the position of "intrinsic entailment" (*antarvyāpti*) (Kajiyama 1999). His compositions on the *prajñāpāramitā* include the *Sārottamā*, a commentary on the eight-thousand line discourse, and the *Śuddhamatī*, a commentary to the twenty-five-thousand-line text. Ratnākaraśānti's compositions on tantric philosophy and practice were significant for explaining the "method of mantras" (*mantranaya*) in terms of Buddhist scholasticism. His tantric works included commentaries and instruction manuals (*sādhana*) on the *Hevajratantra* and the *Guhyasamājatantra*.

Ratnākaraśānti composed works where he systematized the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu with that of Nāgārjuna to establish his version of the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratīpat*) that, implicitly or explicitly, was supported with works and doctrines affiliated with

3) See Kano 2016, 71-74.

Yogācāra thinkers.⁴ The Middle Way for Ratnākaraśānti consisted of a Yogācāra position in which mental images, or aspects, in cognition are false (**alīkākāravāda*). As noted by Isaacson & Sferra (2014, 64), “His close contemporary Ratnakīrti refers to the position of Ratnākaraśānti with the expression *alīkākārayogin pāramārthikaprakāśamātra*.” That is, “a yogin who posits images as false whereby only mere luminosity is ultimate reality.” It is also noted that “Ratnakīrti distinguishes this view of Ratnākaraśānti from Nirākāravijñānavāda” (Isaacson & Sferra 2014, 64 n.21), which indicates that his contemporary did not regard Ratnākaraśānti as upholding a consciousness only, or Yogācāra, view free from cognitive images (*ākāra*). Among his numerous works, Ratnākaraśānti primarily articulated his complex, yet refined, position in several of his independent writings such as the *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa* (MAU), the *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti-madhyamaṅgārasiddhi* (MAV), the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (VMS), and the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (PPU).⁵

The philosophical position of Ratnākaraśānti was quite complex and does not easily fit into the traditional categories of Buddhist thought represented in Tibetan doxographical literature (*grub mtha', siddhānta*).⁶ In brief, Ratnākaraśānti articulated a Middle Way based on Yogācāra principles that incorporated the theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) with an emphasis on self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) as equivalent to luminosity (*prakāśa, gsal ba*). For Ratnākaraśānti, self-awareness as luminosity constituted the intrinsic nature of all dharmas and was the highest form of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).

Ratnākaraśānti outlined his understanding of the three natures in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*.⁷ He notes that these natures are taught in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

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- 4) Kajiyama 1999; Isaacson 2013; Moriyama 2013; Hayashima 2017. McNamara's (2017, 204) recent study concludes, “while Ratnākaraśānti does acknowledge Nāgārjuna's status as the founding figure for Madhyamaka thought (and for later Mādhyamikas), he does not consider Nāgārjuna himself to be a Mādhyamika...he rather ascribes to Nāgārjuna a stance that is fully in line with the core Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures.”
- 5) Luo (2018) refers to the MAU, MAV, and PPU as the “core trilogy” of the independent writings among Ratnākaraśānti's extant and known works. Note that Ratnākaraśānti's authorship of the *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya* and *Triyānavyavasthāna* has been questioned by Kano (2016).
- 6) As Mimaki (1992, 298) notes, in Tibetan doxographical literature “Ratnākaraśānti is neither classified nominally within the subdivisions of the Madhyamaka school nor in those of the Vijñānavāda.” Luo (2018) states that: “Ratnākaraśānti did not specify his own doctrinal position...” but adds that Ratnākaraśānti shows “his predilection for a type of Mādhyamika defined by him as Rang bzhin gsum gyi dbu ma.”
- 7) The following is a summary of PPU, Derge 4079, 138a2-143a1. For details on this passage see Kajiyama (1965, 393-95), Almogi (2009, 146-47), Brunnhölzl (2011, 136-37), and Luo (2018). Sanskrit equivalents are drawn from

As depicted in Table 1, the PPU describes three natures: the imaginary (*parikalpita*), the dependent (*paratantra*), and the perfect (*pariniṣpanna*). The text notes that all things are mere mind (*cittamātra*), mere consciousness (*vijñānamātra*), and mere luminosity (*prakāśamātra*). In this way there are no external objects (*bāhyārtha*) that are apprehended in cognition (*vijñaptigrāhyaḥ*). Cognition (*vijñapti*) does not exist as having an apprehending subject (*grāhaka*) either. Since both the apprehending subject and apprehended object are mental discourse (*manojalpa*), they are the imaginary nature of all things. They are imagined based on the false imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*) that arises from the latent tendencies (*vāsanā*) of clinging to the imaginary nature despite there not being external objects. False imagination is the dependent nature of things, mistakenness (*bhrānti*), error (*viparyāsa*), and wrong cognition (*mithyājñāna*). What is correct or real is mind's mere luminosity (*prakāśamātra*). Thus, the dependent nature (*paratantra*) is nothing but false imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*).

With this brief summary of Ratnākaraśānti's thought in mind, the following section outlines the thought of Atiśa and his relations with Ratnākaraśānti. I then draw attention to Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34) as a specific instance to illustrate the philosophical differences between Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa.

III. Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti

A traditional biography of Atiśa attributed to his foremost bKa-gdams-pa (hereafter Kadampa) disciple 'Brom ston pa rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas (1004-1064 CE) (2012, 45-46) states that Atiśa first received Madhyamaka teachings under the tantric yogin Avadhūtipa with whom Atiśa studied under for seven years in his youth. The biography mentions that Atiśa learned the Madhyamaka principles of subtle cause and effect under Avadhūtipa, a point specifically mentioned in two other Kadampa manuscripts, the *General Explanation of, and Framework for Understanding, the Two Realities* (*bden gnyis spyi bshad dang / bden gnyis 'jog tshul*) and the *Collection of Special Instructions on the Middle Way* (*dbu ma'i man ngag gi 'bum*, fol. 7b). Atiśa's study of Madhyamaka under Avadhūtipa is also supported by the

Luo (2018).

colophon to the *Sūtrasamuccayaśāñcayārtha*, which mentions that he received the special instruction (*upadeśa*) regarding the view of non-abiding Middle Way (*apratīṣṭhita [madhyamaka] darśana*) under Avadhūtipa.⁸⁾

Around the year 1012 when Atiśa was approximately thirty years old, he embarked on a dangerous voyage to Indonesia to study under Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa, known in Tibetan as gSer-gling-pa, “the man from Sumatra Island.” According to the traditional sources, Atiśa studied under gSer-gling-pa for twelve years and returned to India in 1025 around the age of forty-two (Chattopadhyaya 1967, 85). A traditional biography states that gSer-gling-pa instructed Atiśa to study with Ratnākaraśānti at Vikramaśīla upon returning to India. Atiśa may have arrived at Vikramaśīla after being appointed as Upādhyāya (preceptor) at Vikramaśīla with responsibility also for Uddanḍapura under King Bheya-pāla, who reigned according to Tārānātha as the predecessor of Neyāpāla (r. ca. 1027–43). These anecdotes indicate that Atiśa was assigned to Vikramaśīla and advised to study under Ratnākaraśānti when he was middle aged. The early biographies of Atiśa preserved in Kadampa documents mention that he learned the perfections and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka while studying the eight thousand line *Perfection of Wisdom* under Ratnākaraśānti at Vikramaśīla.⁹⁾ An early biography also states that Atiśa, at first, upheld the *Nirākāravāda* view of Śāntipa, and later discarded it for the view of Ācārya Nāgārjuna. This discord on view may have been a source of dispute between Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa.¹⁰⁾ Based on the biographical material, we can surmise that

8) *Sūtrasamuccayaśāñcayārtha*, extended colophon not in Derge Tanjur but *Bstan'gyur gser bris ma, mdo 'grel a*, fōl. 513r...*lha khang ke ru'i khyams smad kyī ban de bdag gyi zhus te gdams ngag dang bcas te gnang ngo' jo bo'i bla ma a wa dhū ti pas rab tu mi gnas pa'i lta ba dang / las mtha' sems bskyed pa'i cho ga dang / mdo kun las btus pa'i don man ngag tu byas pa 'di gsum stabs gcig tu gnang ba lags so //* Cf. Chattopadhyaya 1967, 462.

9) mChim 2012, 81.20; Bya 'dul 2014, 276.9-12. Atiśa himself is reported to have said in this regard that, “When my guru Śāntipa was teaching the eight thousand verse [Perfection of Wisdom], for all the explanations of Madhyamaka, he refuted each and every one of them, and my Madhyamaka view itself became refreshed. The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka [system] became extremely clear. I had great faith in the system of Candrakīrti.” (mChim nam kha' grags 2014, 69: *nga'i bla ma shanti ba bygyad stong pa gsungs tsa na dbu mar bshad pa thams cad re re nas sun phyung bas / nga'i dbu ma'i lta ba de nyid gsal btub ba bzhin du song / mal [69.15] 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma shin tu gsal bar gyur/ nga zla ba grags pa'i lugs la shin du dad pa yin gsungs /*)

10) Bya 'dul 2014, 250.10-14: “The Lord [Atiśa] first upheld the view of False Aspectarian Mind-Only of the Guru Ratnākaraśānti and having discarded that, then upheld the view of the system of Ācārya Nāgārjuna. In casting away the view, Lord [Atiśa] made a great offering to the Guru Ratnākaraśānti. He was not pleased as the view upheld by the student should be the same. These are used up as being pure views” (*jo bo dang po ni bla ma rad na 'a ka ru shan ti'i sems tsam mam rdzun pa'i lta ba 'dzin pa la de bor nas slob dpon klu sgrub kyī lugs kyī lta ba 'dzin*

the Madhyamaka teachings that Atiśa initially received in his youth were in conflict with the views of Ratnākaraśānti that Atiśa learned while studying under him at Vikramaśīla.

In addition to statements in the biographies, a brief comparison of the works of Ratnākaraśānti with Atiśa's affiliated works indicate that they differed on a number of points of thought and exegesis. Ratnākaraśānti supported the three vehicle (*yānatraya*) doctrine of traditional Yogācāra, while Atiśa advocated the single vehicle (*ekayāna*) theory of the Mādhyamika.¹¹⁾ Ratnākaraśānti differentiated two groups of Mādhyamikas in his *Triyānavyavasthāna* based on their application of the tetralemma in negating either the binaries existence/non-existence or permanent/impermanent.¹²⁾ Atiśa, on the other hand, does not differentiate Madhyamaka based on this distinction. Moreover, in his *Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā* Atiśa incorporates both sets of binaries in his application of the tetralemma. That is, in this work Atiśa applies the tetralemma twice, once to the fourfold negation of existence/non-existence and to the fourfold negation of permanent/impermanent.¹³⁾ Even though Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti both accepted the luminous nature of the mind, awareness for Atiśa dependently arises and lacks any essence, while for Ratnākaraśānti, awareness, at least on the level of non-duality, is ultimately real.

In his *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa*, Ratnākaraśānti criticized positions that advocated “mere appearance.”¹⁴⁾ I think that Atiśa is Ratnākaraśānti's opponent here as Atiśa clearly

pa yin / lta ba 'bor ba la jo bos bla ma rad na ^a kar shan ti pa la 'bul ba chen po cig byas / des kyang ma mnyes slob ma bya ba lta ba 'dzin pa gcig dgos pa yin gsung/ de mams lta ba nam par dag pa yin byas su zad /).

11) On Ratnākaraśānti advocacy of the three vehicle (*yānatraya*) theory see Kano (2016, 74-79). Cf. PPU, D 162a7: *sna tshogs khams ldan sbye bo ma lus mams kyang theg pa gsum gyis nges 'byung shog /*. For Atiśa's support of the *ekayāna* see Apple (2013, 296-297), and Atiśa's *Sngags kyi don la 'jug pa. de yang sgyu 'phrul drwa ba las / theg pa gsum gyi nges 'byung la / / theg pa gcig gi 'bras bur gnas / zhes gsung pa'i don gyis na / gsum ni rgyu yin la / gcig ni 'bras bu'i ngo bo nyid du btan pa yin no /*.

12) Ruegg 1981, 123; Hayashi 1996. Note that Kano (2016) argues that the authorship of the *Triyānavyavasthāna* is falsely attributed to Ratnākaraśānti.

13) Sherburne 2000, 250-251.

14) Ratnākaraśānti, *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa*, [Yiannopoulos 2012, 196] ff. 229.b.1-2: *gshan yang dbu ma pa chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bu nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no zhes zer te / 'di ltar gal te 'di dag tshad mas med par ma grub na de'i phyir 'gas kyang yod pa bsgrub par mi nus so / tshad ma ma yin pa la snang ba tsam gyis lta smos kyang ci dgos / thams cad med pa nyid yin na ci zhig nye bar blangs nas ci zhig gdags /*; “Some adherents of the Middle Way claim that the Path of the Middle Way is just the illusoriness of phenomena. But if these [phenomena] are proven to be nonexistent by a means of reliable knowledge, then it is impossible to establish their existence by means of anything at all. So what need is there to mention establishment by mere appearance, which is not even

articulated an interpretation of Madhyamaka emphasizing mere appearances (*snang ba tsam*) in his *General Explanation of the Two Realities*, a manuscript found in the *Collected Works of the Kadampas*.¹⁵⁾ In fact, Ratnākaraśānti has a word-play critique for Mādhyamikas who assert mere appearances (*snang tsam dbu ma pa*) when he states that “those who assert everything is false” are pseudo-Mādhyamikas (*dbu ma ltar snang ba*).¹⁶⁾ Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti also differed as to the role of negation in realizing what they considered as the ultimate, with Atiśa emphasizing only nonimplicative negations (*prasajyapratīṣedha*) in his *General Explanation*¹⁷⁾ and Ratnākaraśānti in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* describing the perfected nature as a implicative negation (*pariyudāsapratīṣedha*).¹⁸⁾ Ratnākaraśānti criticized the Madhyamaka position that conventional reality exists “without analysis,” a position that is explicitly stated in Atiśa’s *Satyadvayāvatāra*.¹⁹⁾ Ratnākaraśānti also refuted Candrakīrti’s “what is renown in the world position” for conventional reality and advocated the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) for realizing ultimate reality²⁰⁾ while Atiśa strongly opposed the means of valid cognition for realizing ultimate reality.²¹⁾

a means of reliable knowledge? If everything is just nonexistent, then what is it that is designated, and in dependence upon what?”

- 15) See Atiśa’s *General Explanation* (Apple 2016) which fully articulates mere appearances.
- 16) MAV (D. 120a2-4): *yang gang zhi thams cad brdzun par smra ba ni dbu ma ltar snang ba yin no /*.
- 17) Atiśa’s *General Explanation* (Apple 2016, 644-49, 653-54, 699).
- 18) See Brunnhölzl (2011, 143-144) on Ratnākaraśānti and implicative negation.
- 19) *Satyadvayāvatāra* (verse 3): “Some thing which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which arises and ceases to exist and which is capable of causal efficiency is held to be correct convention” (Ejima 1983, 362: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga’ba’i / slye ba dang ni ’jig pa’i chos / / don byed nus dang ldan pa ni / / yang dag kun rdzob yin par ’dod /*). See Moriyama (2013, 6).
- 20) Yiannopoulos (2012, 191-192) citing *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa*, fol. 228b3-4: *gang yang dbu ma pa kha cig na re ’jig rten las grags pa ni kun rdzob yin te / phyi rol gyi don yang ’jig rten la grags pa yin pas / sems dang sems las byung ba bzhin du de yang kun rdzob tu yod pa yin no / sems dang sems las byung ba ni ’khrul pa yin te / rang gi rig pa ’gal ba’i phyir ral gri’i sos rang mi gcod pa bzhin no /*. Ibid, fol. 229b5-6: *tshad mar khas len na ni rang bzhin gsum gyi tshul du grub pas thams cad brdzun du smra ba thong zhig / gal te bdag cag ni tshad ma mi ’dod pa’i phyir ro zhe na / tshad ma med pa’i phyir rtsod par smra ba ni bzhad gad pa nyid yin no /*; (Yiannopoulos (2012,197): “If you accept that there are means of reliable knowledge, then they are established in the manner of the three natures. So abandon the contention that everything is false! And if you say, “But we don’t assert that there are means of reliable knowledge!”, well, people who debate without any means of reliable knowledge are just clowns.”
- 21) *Satyadvayāvatāra* (verse 10): “Direct perception and inference are the two [*pramāṇas*] accepted by Buddhists. The deluded whose vision is narrow say that emptiness is understood by these two” (Ejima 1983, 363: *mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag / / sangs rgyas pa yis de gnyis gzung / / gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zhes / / tshul rol mthong ba’i*

Along these lines, Ratnākaraśānti severely criticized the position that buddhahood was “inconceivable” and exhausted of all mind and mental functions. Instead, Ratnākaraśānti advocated that a Buddha’s realization has mental qualities.²²⁾ Atiśa, on the other hand, strongly advocated in such works as the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghaṭamādhyaṃakopadeśa* (Apple 2010), *Bodhicāryavatārabhāṣya* (Mochizuki 1999), and *Ekasṃṛtyupadeśa* (Almogi 2009) an understanding of buddhahood as bereft of all mental qualities, being without conceptuality and inconceivable. Atiśa and his Kadampa followers claimed this understanding of buddhahood based on the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.²³⁾

In addition to these points, the early Kadampa commentaries also mention that Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti had discordant philosophical views.²⁴⁾ An early history records that Atiśa’s system of following Nāgārjuna displeased Ratnākaraśānti, because for Śāntipa the student and teacher should share the same view.²⁵⁾ A Kadampa manuscript also mentions that Ratnākaraśānti broke up a class session, presumably at Vikramaśīla, when he overheard Atiśa teaching emptiness to several students.²⁶⁾

rmongs pa smra //.

- 22) Yannopoulos (2012, 194) citing *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa*, fol. 228b7-229a1: *ci ste yang 'di ni rtogs pa kho na yin no zhe na / de nyid sems yin pas sems dang sems las byung ba med pa ma yin no / gzhan yang don dam pa de gzhan du gyur pa myong na ni 'khrul par 'gyur la / tha mi dad na ni rang rig par 'gyur ro /*.
- 23) See Dunne 1996, MacDonald 2009, Apple 2015, 2016 on buddhahood being bereft of mind and mental factors in the work of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Atiśa.
- 24) Apple (2013, 321): “gSer-gling-pa and Śāntipa are ācāryas but have discordant views [from Atiśa]” (*gser gling ba dang shan ti ba lasogs pa dag kyang slob dpon yin te / lta ba mi mthun*).
- 25) *The Universally Known Biography* (2014, 67.8-12): *jo bo dang po bla ma ratna ā kara shānti pa'i lta byas sems tsam mam brdzun 'dzin pa la phyis de bor nas slob dpon klu sgrub lugs kyi lta ba 'dzin pa yin / lta ba de 'bor ba la jo bos bla ma shānti pa la 'bul ba chen po byas kyang ma mnyes te / slob ma bya ba lta ba 'dzin pa cig dgos pa yin gsung skad do //*.
- 26) See *Collection of Special Instructions on the Middle Way* (*dbu ma'i man ngag gi 'bum*, fol. 1a) translated in Apple (2015, 25-26): “At the onset, [Atiśa] did not have great reverence for Śāntipa. Later, when [Śāntipa] heard him [i.e., Atiśa] among Tibetans like a bull stating that “the proper object is that all things do not have inherent existence,” [Śāntipa] was not pleased. It is said that Lord [Atiśa], immediately upon initiating a discussion on a little bit of Madhyamaka, was thrown out due to [Śāntipa] being annoyed” (fol. 1a5-6: *shanti ba la dang po thugs tshod mi mnga' / phyis gang ngan pas kho bod pa glang dang 'dra ba'i gseb na chos thams cad rang bzhin med pa yin zer gyin bzla yin 'dug lo gsung nas ma mnyes bya ba yang zer / jo bos dbu ma'i zur tsam re gleng bslang ma thag tu sun nal nal 'byin bya ba yang gsungs so /*).

IV. Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti on Yuktiśaṣṭikā, verse 34

As a specific example to further illustrate the differences between these two scholars, I draw attention to their respective interpretations of Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34). Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* ("Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning") is a collection of stanzas centered around the topic of *pratītyasamutpāda* elucidated by reasoning (*yukti*). The sixty-one stanzas of the work argue that the world of origination and disintegration is an illusion created by ignorance (*aviśyā*). The text advocates that the Buddha taught the path to dissolve this illusion and its related suffering. Individual verses are cited by Indian commentators to support points of debate within Madhyamaka and Yogācāra exegesis. Verse 34 is often cited (along with verse 21), and commented by Indian and Tibetan authors with regard to the question of whether or not Nāgārjuna posited the existence of external objects.²⁷⁾

Ratnākaraśānti himself cites *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34) in six different works at least eight times overall as an authority for supporting his view. Ratnākaraśānti provides an exegesis on the verse in four of his works including one preserved in Sanskrit as recently discussed by Isaacson.²⁸⁾

The verse in Sanskrit reads:

mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktaṃ samavarudhyate / /
tajjñāne vigamaṃ yāti²⁹⁾ nanu mithyā vikalpitam //³⁰⁾

Things explained, such as the great elements and so forth, are enclosed in consciousness.

They cease [to exist] when this is known. Indeed, they are a mistaken construction

27) The verse has been cited in the works of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Vidyākaraṇa (Scherer-Schaub 1991, note 492).

28) The citation of *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34) in Ratnākaraśānti's works includes *Muktāvalī* (exegesis, see Isaacson 2013), *Kuṣumāñjaliguhyasamājanibandha* (chapter 2), *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (D 4072, fol. 111a7), *Madhyamakālaṅkāropadeśa* (D. 4085, see Yiannopoulos 2012, 231), *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣyaratnālokaṅkāra*, and *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (D. 4079, fol. 143a2-143b1, 149b7-150a3, see Brunnhölzl 2011, 134).

29) Reading with Seyfort Ruegg, *loc. cit.*: *yadī*.

30) The verse is conserved in Sanskrit in the *Sākāra-siddhi-śāstra* and the *Sākāra-saṃgraha-sūtra* of Jñānaśrīmitra (980-1030, Mimaki, 1976, 7) in the *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī* (Scherer-Schaub 1991, note 492) and in Ratnākaraśānti's *Muktāvalī* (Isaacson 2013).

(*log par nam brāgs = mithyā vikalpitam*).

In the discussion of this verse in her meticulous study of the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, Cristina Scherrer-Schaub (1991, 252, note 492) advises readers to recall how objects of knowledge are generally construed by the four main schools of Buddhist thought. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika affirms that objects of knowledge really exist and are external to knowledge. Sautrāntikas claim that although objects exist externally to knowledge, such objects are not able to be directly known and their existence must be inferred. Vijñānavādins claim that objects do not exist apart from knowledge and therefore knowledge is only reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Mādhyamikas understand that an object of knowledge is neither existent nor non-existent insofar as an object exists as long as the knowledge is “determined” under the hold of ignorance. But the existence of objects are false as objects no longer exist when ignorance ceases. In interpreting this verse Ratnākaraśānti’s view is an extension of the principles of Vijñānavāda while Atiśa’s is a position of pure Madhyamaka based on Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

Among his works that cite this verse, Ratnākaraśānti’s *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* provides an exegesis.³¹⁾ He explains after citing *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* verse 21 and then verse 34,

(1) Stating that the **great elements and so forth are enclosed in consciousness** means they are included within that [consciousness] and just as the great external elements do not exist, ordinary individuals produce a consciousness which appears there and since that **dissappears due** to utmost non-mistaken **wisdom**, because it is imagined at a previous time due to false imagination and **mistaken construction**, it “is false” which is the meaning of the second stanza. On just this very point the tenets of Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas are the same.

(2) Due to the following point they are different. The Yogācāras state that entities apprehended by ordinary individuals do not exist because they are false. Cause and effect is ascertained and since the genuine nature, reflexive awareness, is bereft of mistakes the basis of luminosity is accepted as the only truth/reality.

31) Ratnākaraśānti also explains this verse in his *Muktāvālī* (see Isaacson 2013) and his *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* (McNamara 2017, 201-2).

(3) Mādhyamikas accept that the nature which appears as cause and effect and the mistaken phenomenal marks individually known do not exist as they are imputed. Even the dharmas of the genuine luminous basis do not exist as they are unable to withstand extremely subtle analysis.

(4) Those who say that “the luminous nature of dharmas just-as-it-is is just like the aspects/ images of blue and so forth” do not respect as correct because that is devoid of scripture and reasoning.

(5) Some Mādhyamikas say that “just as conventionally, mind and mental factors exist, likewise external objects do not exist and ultimately even mind and mental factors, because they are mistaken by nature, do not exist in the purview of reflexive awareness. Bodhisattvas establish spontaneously in every aspect the aims of all sentient beings through the blessings of the form body like a wishfulfilling jewel and directly realize complete, perfect, awakening. Furthermore, for that reason, just as all dharmas do not ultimately exist since likewise even mind and mental factors do not ultimately exist, the refutation of mind and mental factors is a concordant correct realization. That is unsuitable with respect to others.” As this statement is far from all scriptures and treatises and valid cognition, wrongful paths such like these should be kept at a distance and abandoned.³²⁾

32) PPU (D 4079, 143a2-143b1): / *klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas kyang / dngos nmams skye ba yod min zhing // 'gag pa'ang gang na yod min te // shes pa 'di nyid kho na ni // skye zhing 'gag par 'gyur ba yin // 'byung ba che la sogs pa // mam par shes su yang dag 'du // ye shes kyis ni de bral na // log par nmam brtags cis ma yin // zhes byas ba 'di thams cad gsungs te /*

(1) **'byung ba chen po** la sogs pa gang gsungs pa de dag **mam shes su yang dag par 'du ba ste** / de'i nang du gtogs par 'gyur te / phi rol gyi 'byung ba chen po la sogs pa med pa bzhin du yang byis pa mams der snang ba'i mam par shes pa skye la / shin tu ma 'khrul pa'i **ye shes kyis** de nub par gyur pas / **log par brtags** te 'khrul ba'i rtogs bas sngar gyi dus su brtags pa nyid kyi phyir / brdzun pa nyid yin no zhes bya ba ni tshigs su bcaad pa gnyis pa'i don yin no // de nyid kyis na rnal 'byor spyod pa pa mams dang / dbu ma pa grub pa'i mtha' mtshungs pa yin no /

(2) / cha 'di tsam gyis ni tha dad pa yin te / rnal 'byor sbyod pa pa mams ni byis pas **gzung** ba'i chos mams brdzun pa'i phyir yod pa ma yin la / rgyu dang 'bras bur nges pa dang / gnyug ma'i rang bzhin rang rig pa 'khrul pa dang bral bas gsal ba'i lus ni / bden pa kho nar 'dod do /

(3) / dbu ma pa nmams ni / rgyu dang 'bras bur snang ba'i rang bzhin dang / so so rang gis rig pa 'khrul pa'i mshan ma nmams sgro btags pa ma yin pa rnal ma bsal ba'i lus kyi chos mams kyang shin tu phra ba brtags mi bzod pas yod pa yang ma yin la / med pa yang ma yin par 'dod do /

In this passage, which I have separated into five sections, Ratnākaraśānti explains verse 34 from the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* and then identifies points of agreement as well as differences between Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas, and several unnamed opponents. Section 1 indicates that Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that the cognitions of ordinary individuals (*byis pa, bāla*) are false. Section 2 explains that while entities apprehended by ordinary individuals are false, a basis of luminosity (*bsal ba'i lus*), reflexive awareness (*rang rig pa*), is accepted by Yogācāras. A point that Ratnākaraśānti also accepted as previously indicated (in Chapter II). Section 3 describes Mādhyamikas in general as not accepting a genuine luminous basis (*rnal ma bsal ba'i lus*) of dharmas. Section 4 mentions an unnamed opponent who accepts a luminous nature of dharmas as the same as their cognitive content or aspects/images (*ākāra*). This position resembles a Sākāravāda proponent like Jñānaśrīmitra who accept images as ultimately existent.³³⁾ Section 5 identifies a Mādhyamika who does not accept mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) as ultimately existing and accepts the spontaneous salvific activity of a buddha's form body like a wishfulfilling jewel. This is the position of Atiśa who, following Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, does not accept the ultimate existence of mind and mental factors in buddhahood as does Ratnākaraśānti (see above Chapter III). In brief, Ratnākaraśānti framed the ultimate nature of mental qualities as their “mere luminosity of non-duality” (*advayaparakāśamātra*) and criticized Mādhyamika positions that negated the existence of luminous reflexive awareness, the basis of luminosity which is bereft of mistakes (*gnyug ma'i rang bzhin rang rig pa 'khrul pa dang bral bas gsal ba'i lus*). Ratnākaraśānti also refuted the

(4) / gang yang kha cig chos mams kyi gsal pa'i rang bzhin ji lta ba de bzhin du sngon po la sogs pa'i mam pa la yang de bzhin no zhes zer ba de ni / lung dang rigs pa [D. 143b1] dang bral ba'i phyir 'thad par 'os pa ma yin no /

(5) / gang yang dbu ma pa kha cig na re kun rdzob sems dang sems las byung ba yod pa de bzhin du / phyi rol don kyang yod pa ma yin la / don dam par sems dang sems las byung ba mams kyang rang bzhin gyis 'khrul pa'i phyir / rang rig pa'i ngo bor yod pa ma yin te / byang chub sems dpa' mams kyi / sems can thams cad kyi don mam pa thams cad du lhun gyis grub par bya ba'i phyir yid bzhin gyi nor bu ltar gzugs kyi sku byin gyis brlabs nas bzhag ste / yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon sum du mdzad do // de yang gang gi phyir ji ltar chos thams cad don dam par shin tu med pa de bzhin du / sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad kyang don dam par shin tu med pas / sems dang sems las byung ba mams shin tu 'gags pa ni rjes su mthun pas yang dag par rtogs pa yin te /gzhan la de ni mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes ba de ni lung dang bstan bcos thams cad dang / 'thad ma mams las phyi rol du gyur ba yin pas lam ngan pa de lta bu de dag ni thag bsrings te spang bar bya'o /

33) See Kano (2016, 54-69) on the Sākāravāda of Jñānaśrīmitra.

position which understands a buddha to spontaneously act like a wishfulfilling jewel without conceptuality, a position explicitly followed by the Madhyamaka of Atiśa.³⁴⁾

Atiśa's understanding of *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (verse 34) is found in his *General Explanation of the Two Realities*.³⁵⁾ The *General Explanation* is an exposition on the two realities that integrates Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka of mutual dependence and dependent designation within the framework of Atiśa's stages of the path (*lam rim*) teachings. The overall work is an extended teaching on the nominalistic Madhyamaka of "mere appearances." Atiśa's system of the two realities in the *General Explanation* is outlined in Table 2.

Atiśa follows a strict Madhyamaka understanding based on Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva where Buddhahood does not have any mind or mental functions. In Atiśa's Madhyamaka all appearances are based on ignorance (698.20) and comprised of ignorance. Appearances are not non-existent but rather false, erroneous, and mistaken (700.20). The synonyms of the conventions of mere appearance in Atiśa's nominalistic Madhyamaka are mere name, mere word, mere convention, and mere imputation (702.12). For Atiśa, the subjective perceiver, the appearance of the cognition, and the appearance of the mind which is like an illusion are established as mere name (702.19).

Ultimate reality (*paramārthasatya*) is a purified appearance of non-appearance (*snang ba med pa*) like the center of space (739.17), known through individually intuited knowledge (740.5). For Atiśa, the "ultimate" is a conventional expression, also embodied by the phrase realm of reality (*dharmadhātu*), consisting of selfless non-appearances that are realized with non-conceptual pristine awareness (*jñāna*) (740.15). The realm of reality is a naturally pure object of realization that is the ever-present real state of things (741.5), that may be cognized in meditative equipoise (721.10), but is not completely actualized until full buddhahood.

Conventional realities are appearances that arise due to causes and conditions (697.6). All conventional realities are false and deceiving, but they are not non-existent. Rather, they are mere appearances (*snang ba tsam*) subject to the principle of cause and effect imputed

34) Atiśa, in his *spyod 'jug 'khor lo lta bu lam rgyud la ji ltar skye ba'i rim pa bzhugs* (861.3-862.16; Mochizuki 1999, 116-118), follows Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.35 in advocating that buddhas act without conceptuality like a wishfulfilling jewel. See also Prajñāmukti's commentary to Atiśa's *Madhyamakopadeśa* (Apple 2015, 19-20).

35) The following summary of Atiśa's *General Explanation of the Two Realities* (*bden gnyis spyi bshad dang / bden gnyis 'jog tshul*) is drawn from Apple 2016. The page and line number of the 2006 edited Tibetan version of the text is cited.

through dependent-arising. In Atiśa's system, conventional realities are classified as mistaken or correct from different perspectives in relation to the cognitive understanding of ordinary individuals or the realizations of those who have reached the path of vision (*darśanamārga*, *mthong lam*) (697.9-698.5).³⁶⁾

Mistaken conventional realities are appearances of ignorance that impute impermanent and empty things as either existent or non-existent. Mistakes (*log pa*) are impermanent and suffering and they are also deceptive (*shu ba*) and false (*rdzun*). Mistaken appearances are like the hair that is perceived by someone suffering from eye disease (723.10). Correct conventional realities are appearances of discerning awareness (*rig pa shes rab*) that occur after the path of vision (*mthong lam*) and are considered pure mundane wisdom (*dag pa lo ka ba'i ye shes*) (717.16). Correct conventional realities are considered non-deceptive (*mi shu ba*), non-erroneous, and trustworthy (*gid brtan du rung ba*) in that, from this perspective, appearances are realized to be unproduced like an illusion and objects are cognized as essenceless entities. Although correct, they are conventional due to arising through causes and conditions (733.9) and are considered illusions of pristine awareness (*rig pa ye shes kyi sgyu ma*) (717.7; 735.9). Correct conventional realities are non-erroneous illusions (*ma 'khrul ba sgyu ma*) (717.7) and are imputations (726.5) conducive to purification, since the causes of purification have non-deceptive individual results (733.10).

Atiśa does not furnish a specific exegesis on *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34) in his *General Explanation of the Two Realities* as does Ratnākaraśānti. Rather, Atiśa's understanding of *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34) occurs in a section of the *General Explanation* where he discusses

36) It is important to note that Atiśa is following the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, *Madhyamakahrdaya*, and the *Tarkajvālā* attributed to Bhāviveka on this point in relation to the broader context of Candrakīrti's system. This is because the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, as well as Jñānagarbha's autocommentary to the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā*, mention that conventional reality, qualified by being not examined, produced by causes, and causal efficiency, is from the perspective of those with narrow vision (*tshu rol thong ba*, *arvāgdarśana*), the ordinary worldly person before the path of vision. Correct conventional reality for the yogi, according to Atiśa and his Kadampa followers, occurs only after the path of vision. This accords with appearances of "purified worldly knowledge (*viśuddhalaukikajñāna*) mentioned by Bhāviveka in his *Madhyamakahrdaya* and *Tarkajvālā*, which he refers to as the stairway of correct conventional reality (*tathyaśaṣṭisopānam*). As Ruegg (2000, 17) has noted "In Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna's time and circle, Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's schools of Madhyamaka were apparently not clearly differentiated by distinct designations and they were evidently being studied side by side." See Apple (2013) for this point of Atiśa's system.

correct conventional reality. In the context of this section of Atiśa's text, the works of Nāgārjuna including *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, *Cittavajrastava*, *Bodhicittavivarāna*, *Bhāvanākrama*, and the *Ratnāvali* are utilized as proof texts to demonstrate that objects and cognitions are considered imputations of mere appearance. Based on these works of Nāgārjuna, Atiśa does not accept the existence of external objects (709.20-710.5) as all appearances are imputed by the mind. All things within cyclic existence and nirvāṇa are included within one's own mind (738.14) as all appearances and imputations do not pass beyond the mind.

Atiśa's understanding that all things are within one's own mind is also stated in the *Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā* (D285a; Sherburne 2000, 261) based on instructions from his Madhyamaka teacher Bodhibhadra.³⁷⁾ In the *Sayings of the Kadam Masters*, Atiśa states, "There is nothing in this world of appearance and everyday convention that does not come into being except from one's own mind. The mind, too, is an empty awareness, and recognition of it i.e., the empty mind as the non-duality of awareness and emptiness is the view."³⁸⁾

In brief, Atiśa accepts the mind as a mere appearance that is a conjunction of dependently designated causes and conditions. Atiśa's understanding of Nāgārjuna on this point is similar to suggestions made in previous modern scholarship (Scherrer-Schaub 1991; Lindtner 1997; Ruegg 2002, 203) on mentalism in Madhyamaka, and what Shulman has recently called "creative ignorance" (2009, 158ff). That is, Atiśa accepts that due to conceptualization "the world is created out of ignorance" (*ibid*, 158), that "objects themselves are constructed out of ignorance" (*ibid*, 159), and through dependent-arising "appearances are conditioned by ignorance and caused by conceptualization" (*ibid*, 162).³⁹⁾ As Atiśa clarifies in his *General*

37) BMPP (D285a; Sherburne 2000, 261): "All things are contained in the mind, and the mind is contained in the body, make effort to release the body into the realm of reality" (*chos thams cad sems la bsduṣ shing/ sems kyang lus la bsduṣ la/ lus kyang chos kyī dbyings su btang ba...*).

38) *bKa' gdam kyī skyes bu dam pa mam kyī gsung bgros thor bu pa mams*: (3b2-3: 'di ltar snang tshod grags tshod 'di thams cad rang gi sems las ma byung ba med / sems rig pa stong pa yin / de rig stong gnyis med du rtogs pa de lta ba yin; translation Jinpa 2013, 26)

39) The appearances created by ignorance are considered by Atiśa (711-711.10) as mistaken conventional realities for all groups including Madhyamakas who uphold tenets and all those below them. The *General Explanation* mentions that this includes True Aspectarian Madhyamakas, False Aspectarian Madhyamakas, and Māyopamādvayavadins. The text states that its acceptance of mistaken conventional realities in terms of establishing cognition as mind is similar to how True Aspectarians (**Satyākāravādins*) posits aspects, or cognitive images (*ākāra*). This is

Explanation quoting Nāgārjuna's *Bhāvanākrama*, "appearances as mere appearance are empty and the elements are only ignorance."⁴⁰ Therefore, in Atiśa's understanding of *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (verse 34) the great elements are made to cohere in consciousness and arise through dependent designation based on ignorance. Those mistaken constructions dissipate with the realization of emptiness.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti both accepted the falsity of conventional appearances but they do so in dissimilar frameworks that have different trajectories for what constitutes buddhahood and ultimate reality among other topics of dispute. As Tillemans (1990, 64) once remarked, "both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka maintain that objects are reducible to mind, but the Yogācāra, in addition, maintains that the mind is more real than the object." Ratnākaraśānti affirms a refined version of this description while commenting on

comparable to Candrakīrti, who, as pointed out by MacDonald (2009, 151), skillfully adapts the Sautrāntika theory of cognition on the conventional level to justify his own views. This position of Atiśa on the status of external objects is similar to the presentation of "internal" Madhyamaka (*rang gi dbu ma*) presented in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D280a3-81a3; Del Toso 2014). However, the *General Explanation* also states, in correlation with Nāgārjuna accepting appearances as mind, that Atiśa asserts in terms of the mind as mere appearance, a perspective equal to correct conventional reality, that all sentient beings are one single continuum (*rgyud gcig*) (712.1-713.5). All sentient beings are considered as one continuum, for even though they have differences of karmic conditions, they share an undifferentiated self-nature (*rang gi ngo bo la tha dad med pa*) which is free from the two extremes of intrinsic essence. Consciousness is also asserted as one group (*shogs gcig*) by Atiśa (713.5-714.5). In this way, the *General Explanation* presents a mentalist theory of Madhyamaka in which the mind, as mere appearance, is not at all established and is a mere nominal designation free from the extremes of existence and non-existence.

- 40) "Appearances as mere appearance are empty and elemental forces are only ignorance. The intrinsic nature of entities does not exist. The speculative reasoning which becomes conceptual thought when cultivated as mere imputation does not intrinsically exist and is without cognition. Entities do not exist and the basis-of-all does not exist. These are conceived as fabricated things." *Bhāvanākrama* of Nāgārjuna (Derge 2b4-5; Lindtner 1992, 269-270, vs.21-22c). Bka'-gdams-pa reading differs from Tanjur: *snang yang snang tsam na stong ste* {Tanjur, no equivalent} / [21] ma {*nam*} rig tsam du 'byung ba rnam / /dngos po'i rang bzhin yod ma yin/ rtog par 'gyur ba'i rtog ge pa/ /brtags pa tsam du bsgom pa na/ [22] rang bzhin med cing rnam rig med/ /dngos po med cing kun gzhi med/ /'di dag byis pas rab tu brtags/ /Cf. *Lankāvatārasūtra* [10.86(=3.52): *prajñāptimātram tribhavaṃ nāsti vastusvabhāvataḥ/ prajñāptivastubhāvena kalpayiṣyanti tārkikāḥ/* [10.91(=3.48)] *na svabhāvo na vijñaptir na vastu na ca ālayaḥ/ bālair vikalpītā hy ete...*

Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (verse 34) in a later section of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* where he states,

“Yogācāras assert that the fundamental nature of things—mere luminosity—exists substantially (*dravyataḥ*), while the Mādhyamikas do not even assert such a substance.”⁴¹⁾

In Atiśa’s Mādhyamika the substance of sheer luminosity is not even considered as both objects and the mind are construed as a “mere appearance” (*snang ba tsam*) whose conventional existence is dependently designated relative to the level of one’s ignorance. In brief, the view for Atiśa was the non-duality of awareness and emptiness while for Ratnākaraśānti it was the “mere luminosity of non-duality.”

As this paper has demonstrated Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti were clearly philosophical opponents, with their respective understandings of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in sharp adversarial contrast. The paper illustrates, as well, how the same authoritative text, or even the same verse from an authoritative text, could be interpreted by Indian Buddhist scholars to justify various philosophical standpoints. Along these lines, some Indian Buddhist *ācāryas*, namely Ratnākaraśānti, considered it necessary for the esoteric Buddhist preceptor and disciple to share the same philosophical view (*darśana*). In sum, these historical factors indicate that the philosophical differences between Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti may have been a contributing factor for Atiśa to leave for Tibet from Vikramaśīla.

41) *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (D4079, fols. 149b7-150a3): / *’di ltar mal ’byor spyod pa pa ni chos mams kyī rang bzhing gnyug ma gsal ba tsam ni rdzas su yod par ’dod pa in la / dbu ma pa ni rdzas de yang mi ’dod de /* (Sanskrit: *yat tat prakāśamātram dharmāṇāṃ nijaṃ rūpaṃ tad dravyato śtīti yogācārāḥ / tad api dravyato nāśtīti mādhyamikāḥ /*; Nishiyama 2017, 6, note 16). Ratnākaraśānti continues, “However, this difference is understood as [being one in] name only. Therefore, those Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas who dispute with each other without any basis [to do so] are persons of very bad character.” *khyad par ’di yang ming tsam du rtogs so / des na rtsa ba med par mal ’byor spyod pa pa mams dang / dbu ma pa mams lhan cig tu rsod pa ni skye bo shin tu gnas ngan pa nyid /*. See Brunnhölzl 2011, 134.

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Table 2. Atiśa Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna (982-1054 CE), Great Madhyamaka

Conventional Reality (<i>saṃvṛtisatya</i>) “mere appearances”		Ultimate Reality (<i>paramārthasatya</i>)
Mistaken Conventionals	Correct Conventionals [after path of vision]	Realm of Reality (<i>dharmadhātu</i>) Non-appearance Non-arising Selflessness Bereft of mind or mental qualities
-Ordinary individual perspective -Mistaken Obscuration	-Mere Appearance -Single nature of appearance and emptiness -Correct obscuration -illusion of discerning awareness -illusion of pristine awareness	

Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti as Philosophical Opponents with attention to *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*, verse 34

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This article examines philosophical differences between Atiśa Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna (982-1054 CE) and Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970-1030 CE) based on evidence from newly published Tibetan manuscripts. Traditional Tibetan historians describe Atiśa as Ratnākaraśānti's student in the study of Mahāyāna works at Vikramaśīla. Ratnākaraśānti is also recorded in these sources as being a tantric master in a number of lineages upheld by Atiśa. Yet, as this paper demonstrates, these two important Indian Buddhist scholars had significant differences in their philosophical views. The paper compares doctrines found in the works of Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa to clearly demonstrate how they differed on a number of points of thought and exegesis. Although both Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti claimed to follow the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratīpat*) of Nāgārjuna, Atiśa's thought was influenced by Candrakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti expounded his system based on Yogācāra sources. As a specific example to illustrate the differences between these two scholars, the article draws attention to Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* (verse 34), where Atiśa interprets the verse in terms of mere appearances that dependently arise while Ratnākaraśānti framed his interpretation on mental qualities whose ultimate nature consists of the "mere luminosity of non-duality" (*advayaprakāśamātra*). The paper concludes that these differences between Atiśa and Ratnākaraśānti impacted their relationship at Vikramaśīla monastery in eleventh century India.

Keywords : Atīśa, Ratnākaraśānti, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*

2018년 5월 7일 투고

2018년 6월 7일 심사완료

2018년 6월 8일 게재확정